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77 
ON THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 
AARON J. RAPPAPORT
 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than half a century, legal theory has focused on a particular 
objective—to understand and describe the “concept” of law.1 In that 
pursuit, theorists have employed a methodology aptly called “conceptual 
analysis.”2 The result has been a series of striking claims about law's 
nature—that law has a fixed essence, that it is fundamentally normative, 
that it is based on the “marriage” of primary and secondary rules.3  
Both students and scholars have expressed some difficulty in 
understanding the significance of, and justification for, these claims. What 
can it mean to affirm, for example, that law represents the marriage of 
primary and secondary rules? In what sense is that true? Does it reflect 
some belief in a Platonic ideal of law? If not, what exactly justifies the 
claim? Questions like these have intensified in recent years, with several 
scholars going so far as to express doubt about the value of conceptual 
analysis itself.
4
  
 
 
  Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes to thank Brian Bix 
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Of course, questions about the nature of law have long been the subject of debate among 
philosophers and ordinary individuals alike. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (1961) (“Few 
questions concerning human society have been asked with such persistence and answered by serious 
thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’”).  
 2. Conceptual analysis is widely viewed as a dominant, if not the dominant, method of doing 
legal philosophy today. See Brian Bix, Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis, 6 NEWSL. ON PHIL. & 
LAW 1, 2 (Spring 2007) (“Many of the prominent modern legal philosophers . . . have argued instead 
that theories of law do or should focus on the concept of law. Conceptual analysis has been central to 
analytical philosoph . . . as philosophers explored the ‘essential’ or ‘necessary and sufficient’ attributes 
of various concepts.”) (citations omitted); Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 249, 250 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010) [hereinafter Legal 
Realism] (“Modern legal philosophy has, like most of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, 
employed the method of conceptual analysis: hence the title of the seminal work of this genre.”).  
 Prominent among its practitioners are H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, Jules Coleman, Julie Dickson, as 
well as many other lesser-known theorists. See Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and 
the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 99, 106 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter Incorporationism] (“The aim of jurisprudence 
is to shed light on actual legal practice. . . . [T]he distinctive philosophical method is to do so by 
analysing the concepts that figure prominently within it.”); HART, supra note 1; Joseph Raz, Can 
There be a Theory of Law?, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
324 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2006). 
 3. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing these claims in depth). 
 4. Bix, supra note 2, at 5 (“Most of the influential theories about the nature of law are 
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Such doubts strike at the heart of modern jurisprudence, for the demise 
of conceptual analysis would cast a shadow over large swaths of 
philosophical writings in the discipline. For that reason, Brian Bix has 
spoken of the need for a full-scale evaluation of the role of conceptual 
analysis in legal philosophy in order, “to determine whether conceptual 
analysis is appropriate for legal philosophy (or for any area of 
philosophy); whether, even if appropriate, it is sufficient (or needs 
supplementation by moral evaluation); and whether, even if appropriate 
and sufficient, its objectives and achievements are substantial.”5  
The real surprise is that no such effort has been made to date. This is 
not due to a lack of interest, for questions about the methodology of 
jurisprudence have become a central topic of discussion across the 
discipline. The principal obstacle is what might be called the “fog of 
ambiguity” that hangs over the debate. Simply stated, proponents of 
conceptual analysis have been remarkably vague about their 
methodological commitments.
6
 Ronald Dworkin has lamented, “it is 
difficult to find any helpful positive statements of what these methods and 
ambitions are . . . .”7  
 
 
conceptual theories, but these theories are coming increasingly under challenge”). Though common in 
mainstream philosophy, these questions are certainly not the dominant view in legal philosophy. See 
Alex Langlinais and Brian Leiter, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, to be published in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY (draft on file with author) (“In many areas of 
philosophy, doubts about the kind of conceptual and linguistic analysis Hart relies upon have become 
common . . . but not so in legal philosophy, where almost everyone, following Hart, employs the 
method of appealing to intuitions about possible cases to fix the referent of ‘law,’ . . . .”). 
 5. Bix, supra note 2, at 5. 
 6. JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY 2 (2001) (“All legal theorists take an 
implicit stand on meta-theoretical or methodological questions such as [the purpose of the theorizing 
endeavor]. Few, however, address such matters directly, and to the extent to which this does occur, the 
authors concerned often confine themselves to some relatively brief remarks in the course of pursuing 
some other agenda.”). 
 7. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 165 (2006). See also Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, 
Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE 
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355, 357 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter Legal 
Realism/Hard Positivism] (“The nature of conceptual analysis in legal theory is rarely discussed 
explicitly or at great length, though it is widely acknowledged to be the dominant modus operandi of 
jurisprudents.”); Nicos Stavropoulos, Hart’s Semantics, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE 
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 59, 69 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter Hart’s 
Semantics] (“What conceptual analysis is . . . is not altogether clear.”). Even some of the 
methodology’s proponents seem to acknowledge this fact. See Coleman, Incorporationism, supra note 
2, at 99 (Although the importance of Hart’s work “is undisputed, there is a good deal less consensus 
regarding its core commitments, both methodological and substantive.”). Andrew Halpin has noted 
that this may be a problem with conceptual analysis as employed even in mainstream philosophy. See 
ANDREW HALPIN, REASONING WITH LAW 26 (2001) (“Wider reading on conceptual analysis reveals a 
lack of agreement on what the technique (or art) of conceptual analysis amounts to.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/7
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Some of the ambiguities of the methodology can be seen by examining 
the term “conceptual analysis” itself. “Concepts” are the subject matter of 
the investigation, but what precisely is this entity? In debates over the 
concept of law, a concept is widely understood as representing a category 
of phenomena; in this case, the category called “law.”8 When an individual 
speaks of the concept of “law,” she effectively divides the world into two 
classes—things that warrant the label “law” and those that do not. But that 
basic understanding merely raises deeper questions: What is the 
ontological status of this abstract category? Is it a real thing, existing in 
some transcendental sense? Is it just a human construction?
9
 
Questions multiply when one considers the second, operational word in 
“conceptual analysis.” What does it mean to “analyze” a concept? At least 
two forms of analysis can be identified. One can describe what concepts 
are like, or one can prescribe how the concept of law should be 
understood. In the right context, either approach might be appropriate. 
Methodologies, after all, are instrumental: they are useful depending on 
whether (and to the degree that) they promote a theorist’s preferred 
goals.
10
 Thus, the appropriate kind of analysis depends on one’s theoretical 
objectives. The real problem is that defenders of conceptual analysis are 
not always clear or consistent about their ultimate goals, which makes 
identifying their preferred method of analysis challenging.  
In sum, methods of conceptual analysis vary, depending on 
assumptions about the nature of concepts, the goals of the theoretical 
 
 
 8. See Liam Murphy, Razian Concepts, 6 NEWSL. ON PHIL. & LAW 27, 29 (Spring 2007) (“To 
keep things terminologically tractable, let me now just stipulate that a conceptual question is a 
question of basic categorization.”). See also WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1983) (a concept as “an idea, especially a generalized idea of a class 
of objects”). 
 The astute reader will note that, in defining concepts, I am engaged here in a kind of conceptual 
analysis. Agreeing on a preliminary definition of “concepts” is necessary if we are to ensure that we 
are discussing the same subject matter. My interpretation of the term “concept” reflects my own 
judgment about the term’s use by legal theorists. This is a form of “empirical conceptual analysis,” 
which is discussed in more detail later. See Part I.B.  
 9. Other important and controversial details might also be debated. For example, does the 
category called “law” have clearly-defined contours or vague borders? Does it have a logical 
structure? Does it refer to a single concept or several? Subsequent sections examine these and other 
issues in greater detail.  
 10. See Tom Campbell, Prescriptive Conceptualism: Comments on Liam Murphy, ‘Concepts of 
Law’, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 20, 27 (2005) (“The methodology of conceptual analysis is relative to 
the purpose for which the analysis is undertaken.”). See also Ruth Gavison, Comment, in ISSUES IN 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 21, 34 (Ruth Gavison ed., 
1987) (“Generally speaking, criteria of adequacy for theories of law cannot be uniform. Adequacy is a 
relative idea: we must always know the tasks we want the theory to fulfill in order to judge its 
adequacy.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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endeavor, and other factors. Any effort to cut through the fog of ambiguity 
thus requires some insight into how different theoretical commitments 
affect a theorist’s mode of analysis. To advance that objective, this paper 
surveys the different ways conceptual analysis can be used in legal theory, 
exposing the underlying assumptions of each approach. The result is a 
kind of typology of conceptual methodologies.  
The effort identifies four primary kinds of conceptual analysis—
intuitive, empirical, categorical, and contingent. These four variants, 
diagrammed in Figure 1, differ based on how they address some of the key 
factors previously mentioned. For example, one key distinction is the 
theoretical objective of the endeavor. Intuitive and empirical analyses 
serve descriptive goals, which represent attempts to model how 
individuals actually use and understand the concept of law. Categorical 
and contingent forms of conceptual analysis, by contrast, serve 
“normative” goals, which are attempts by theorists to say how the concept 
of law should be understood.  
Additional assumptions divide these groups further. The two 
descriptive methods of analysis differ based on their views regarding the 
nature of concepts. Intuitive analysis assumes that concepts represent 
transcendental phenomena, while empirical analysis assumes they are 
human constructs. Analogously, the normative methods differ based on the 
types of justifications used to prescribe the choice of concepts. Categorical 
analysis relies on moral principles of justification, while contingent 
analysis relies on instrumental standards of authority.  
FIGURE 1 
 
 
This framework makes clear that the term “conceptual analysis” refers, 
not to a single approach, but to a range of different methodologies. That 
finding, while interesting in itself, also serves as a necessary step towards 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/7
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evaluating the various methods of analysis. By exposing the assumptions 
underlying each approach, an assessment of their merits becomes feasible.  
So what can be said about these methods of analysis? Do any of the 
methodologies seem appealing as a jurisprudential method? This article’s 
preliminary answer is sharply negative. Each type has certain decisive 
flaws: intuitive analysis rests on unconvincing assumptions about the 
transcendental nature of concepts; empirical analysis calls for research 
skills beyond the competence of most legal theorists; categorical analysis 
relies on deeply flawed moral arguments for choosing a concept of law; 
and contingent approaches make implausible assumptions about the 
benefits of certain favored concepts. The implication is that none of the 
dominant methods of conceptual analysis offer an appealing methodology 
to ground legal theory.  
If that conclusion is correct, legal philosophy faces a reckoning. 
Theorists in the field must reconsider their theoretical objectives and tools. 
In other words, they must rethink how legal philosophy is done.  
These conclusions are, to be sure, preliminary. The investigation does 
not attempt to offer a comprehensive survey of the various ways legal 
theorists have analyzed the concept of law. It focuses instead on 
paradigmatic examples of the major types of analysis. It is conceivable, if 
not likely, that individual theorists offer unique or idiosyncratic 
approaches that deserve their own separate treatment. Nonetheless, this 
discussion at the very least should challenge theorists to clarify their 
underlying methodological commitments and to defend those 
commitments more openly and directly. If that happens, the fog of 
ambiguity covering the field of legal philosophy will start to dissipate, and 
a real debate over the proper method of jurisprudence can begin. 
The discussion proceeds in several parts. Part I examines the first major 
school of conceptual analysis—descriptive analysis—and its empirical and 
intuitive variants. Part II scrutinizes normative analysis, including its 
categorical and contingent forms. The concluding section of this article 
steps back to consider what methodology, if any, could replace conceptual 
analysis as the dominant method for “doing jurisprudence.” 
I. DESCRIBING CONCEPTS 
The first major school of conceptual analysis is descriptive analysis, 
which serves “descriptive” goals. Although the term “description” is used 
in various ways in the literature, for purposes of this paper it will refer to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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attempts to mirror or model the external reality of some phenomena.
11
 
Descriptive analysis of this sort has proved particularly popular in legal 
philosophy. H.L.A. Hart, perhaps the most influential legal theorist of the 
last century, made clear that he was primarily engaged in a descriptive 
project, a work of “descriptive sociology” as he called it.12 Hart 
understood “description” in the same way we are using the term, as an 
effort to report—in a non-evaluative way—how human beings use and 
understand concepts, and specifically the concept of law.
13
  
Descriptive theories of conceptual analysis, of course, rest on certain 
assumptions. Perhaps the most basic is that concepts exist in some form 
that can be modeled and described.
14
 But what form is this? Do concepts 
exist independently of human thought? Or are they just figments of our 
minds? Theorists inevitably make assumptions about the nature of 
concepts. As views about the nature of concepts have changed over time, 
so has the methodology used to describe them. The following sections 
trace the evolution of belief from earlier periods into the modern day. 
A. Intuitive Conceptual Analysis  
The traditional approach to descriptive analysis embraced a realist 
view of concepts.
15
 The approach drew upon an ancient idea, rooted in 
 
 
 11. The idea of modeling reality makes intuitive sense, but it also raises complex issues. What 
exactly is modeled—is it a replica of a physical object’s dimensions, an attempt to predict a 
procedure’s output, or something else entirely? Some of these issues are addressed below in more 
detail, but the discussion does not do justice to the complexity of the subject matter. For a survey of 
some of the issues raised by scientific modeling, see Models in Science, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (June 25, 2012), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/.  
 12. HART, supra note 1, at v. See also id. at 239 (“My aim in this book was to provide a theory 
of what law is which is both general and descriptive.”). See also H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES IN 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 35, 37 (Ruth Gavison ed., 
1987) [hereinafter Comment] (“[T]here is a standing need for a form of legal theory or jurisprudence 
that is descriptive and general in scope.”).  
 13. HART, supra note 1, at 240 (“My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has 
no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and 
structures which appear in my general account of law . . . .”). See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 140 (Hart 
asserts that his descriptive project “aims to understand but not to evaluate the pervasive and elaborate 
social practices of law.”); Stephen Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 311, 312 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter Methodological Positivism] (Hart’s statements represent “very good evidence that he 
meant to adopt a framework of methodological positivism.”); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL 
POSITIVISM 64 (1994). 
 14. Bix, supra note 2, at 2 (“To ask the question, what is law? is to assume that there is a sensible 
answer, which in turn seems to assume that there is some object or category ‘law’ one can discuss and 
describe . . . .”).  
 15. See Alexander Miller, Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Spring 2012 
ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/7
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Plato’s theory of the forms, that abstract universals existed on a separate 
metaphysical plane as ideal forms or types. Traditional theorists thus 
assumed that concept-categories arose independently of human thought. 
Theorists, in this way, embraced a striking ontology, at least to modern 
ears. Concepts were not simply products of the human psyche, but part of 
the “furniture” of the universe.  
The realist view created a challenge for theorists. If concepts existed in 
a transcendental realm, theorists could not use empirical tools to identify 
them. What method, then, might give access to this higher reality? The 
answer was that human beings could perceive the concept’s essence 
through some kind of human intuition or innate reasoning ability, a kind of 
special a priori insight.
16
 For that reason, we might call this the “intuitive” 
approach to conceptual analysis. 
Historically, intuitionists claimed that concepts possessed a distinctive 
structure, grounded on certain necessary and sufficient criteria that did not 
change over time or across communities. These fixed and fundamental 
criteria determined the concept’s meaning and application. Thus, in 
deciding whether a given entity fell within the concept’s scope, one simply 
asked if the phenomena satisfied the necessary and sufficient criteria that 
comprised the concept. In this sense, the criteria defined the concept. 
The intuitive methodology offered immediate appeal, especially to 
armchair philosophers. It meant that concepts could be described without 
engaging in the messy business of empirical studies. It meant that 
philosophers—who claimed some insight into the conceptual realm—had 
a privileged role in identifying transcendental concepts. And it meant that 
concepts were logically structured, reflecting a highly ordered reality. 
Despite these appealing features, the intuitive approach has little 
explicit support today. The reasons might be obvious. The idea that 
concepts somehow exist in the nature of things seems difficult for modern 
citizens to accept. As Brian Bix stated, “Platonists are not thick on the 
ground, and they seem particularly rare in the area of theorizing about 
social practices and institutions.”17  
 
 
 16. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 179 (2001) (“On the classic understanding 
of it, the aim of conceptual analysis is to identify an interesting set of analytic truths about the concept 
that are discernible a priori. These truths enable us to identify necessary or essential features of 
instances of the concept . . . .”). An a priori truth is one that “does not depend for its authority upon the 
evidence of experience;” that is, it can be discovered without any observations of the world. This 
contrasts with a posteriori truths, which require observation of the world. See “a priori” and “a 
posteriori”, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). 
 17. Bix, supra note 2, at 2. This may be a bit of an overstatement. Some theorists today view 
themselves as Platonists, at least with respect to certain kinds of concepts. See Mark Balaguer, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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During the 20th century, the intuitive approach was subject to further 
attacks by mainstream philosophers. Of particular note was the publication 
of Quine’s Two Dogmas in 1951, which undermined the idea that 
necessary truths about categories could be discovered.
18
 This was a 
grievous wound. If concepts lacked fixed, necessary features, what was 
left for intuitive analysis to discover? In the face of this onslaught, by the 
mid-20th century, the traditional approach to concepts was on the way out, 
at least in mainstream philosophy. In its place rose a different, more 
naturalistic, approach to concepts.  
B. Empirical Conceptual Analysis 
The dominant approach to concepts today reflects modernity’s general 
skepticism of transcendental entities. Rather than viewing concepts as 
ideal forms, this approach conceives of concepts as human constructs. The 
world does not come pre-segmented into categories; human beings impose 
categories onto reality. These concepts might encompass concrete objects 
(like the concept of a table or car) or they might refer to more abstract 
ideas (such as the concepts of Justice, Art, or Law).  
This seems commonsensical. After all, human beings use and develop 
categories all the time, and it is not surprising that they do. Concepts are 
extremely useful in daily life. Without the mental concept of a tomato for 
example, every tomato one comes across must be treated as a new 
phenomenon, unrelated to any other. We need mental categories to live 
effectively.
19
 
As human constructs, concepts are contingent phenomena, subject to 
change as people’s beliefs change. They can come in and out of existence; 
their contours constantly change in scope. The implication is that there are 
no necessarily true statements about concepts, at least in the sense of fixed 
and permanent truths. Rather, concepts depend on human practice and 
understanding, which is ever-varying.  
 
 
Platonism in Metaphysics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Spring 2014 ed.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/. For an assessment of the view that concepts have real 
essences, see Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or 
Mental Representations, 41 NOÛS 561 (2007).  
 18. WILLIAM VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF 
VIEW 20 (1980).  
 19. GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS 1 (2002) [hereinafter BIG BOOK] 
(concepts are essential for ordinary living); EDWARD E. SMITH & DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, CATEGORIES 
AND CONCEPTS 1 (1981) (similar). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/7
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This new ontology implies a different mode of analysis. Rather than 
relying on a mysterious sense of intuition to engage with a transcendental 
reality, theorists can instead examine earthly conceptual practices. The 
theorist’s goal then is to model how individuals decide what falls within 
the concept’s scope and what does not. Since the goal is to understand 
certain facts about human psychology, we might call this an “empirical” 
analysis of the concept’s use and understanding.20  
The empirical approach has led to a profound change in our 
understanding of conceptual practice. Under the traditional approach, 
theorists believed that concepts could be defined in terms of necessary and 
sufficient criteria.
21
 But in the latter part of the twentieth century, that 
dominant view began to fray. As Jerry Fodor stated, the idea that concepts 
could be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria ran up against 
the discomforting fact that no such definitions could explain how concepts 
were used in ordinary conversation.
22
 The concept of a “bachelor” offers a 
straightforward example of the problem. The term is typically used to refer 
to an “unmarried adult male.” That definition may work for most cases, 
but it does not quite capture our full understanding of the concept. Is the 
Pope a bachelor? Is a widower? Is a gay man living in a long-term 
relationship? 
Even more powerful attacks on the definitional view came from other 
disciplines. Notably, as descriptive analysis increasingly focused on the 
empirical, it became natural for scientists to become involved in their 
study. Using the tools of the scientific method, the emerging field of 
cognitive science began to examine how individuals used and understood 
concepts.
 
Their findings further undercut the view that concepts could be 
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria. Notably, researchers 
 
 
 20. Although he does not go into detail, Stephen Perry appears to describe a similar methodology 
when he refers to the “descriptive-explanatory” approach to conceptual analysis. Under that method, a 
concept’s meaning “would be determined by the relative explanatory power of accepting one way of 
categorizing and describing social practices over another, where ‘explanatory power’ would in turn 
depend on such standard metatheoretical criteria as the following: predictive power, coherence, range 
of phenomena explained . . . .” Perry, Methodological Positivism, supra note 13, at 314. Perry says that 
the “descriptive-explanatory” approach is the “most straightforward understanding” of descriptive 
analysis, which he called “methodological positivism.” Id. at 320. 
 21. This was not, as Lakoff notes, the “result of empirical study. . . . It was a philosophical 
position arrived at on the basis of a priori speculation. Over the centuries it simply became part of the 
background assumptions taken for granted in most scholarly disciplines. In fact, until very recently, the 
classical theory of categories was not even thought of as a theory. It was taught in most disciplines not 
as an empirical hypothesis but as an unquestionable, definitional truth.” GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, 
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 6 (1987).   
 22. JERRY A. FODOR, REPRESENTATIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 284–85 (1981).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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found that this simple “definitional” view conflicted with the actual ways 
in which concepts were used.  
For example, the definitional approach implied that concepts possessed 
sharply defined boundaries. As George Lakoff explained, traditionally, 
concepts “were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside 
or outside the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if 
and only if they had certain properties in common.”23 That meant theorists 
believed that no in-between cases—no ambiguity about the concept’s 
meaning—could exist.24 Moreover, under the definitional model, one 
entity could not be a more typical example of a concept than another.
25
 An 
entity either satisfied the definition or did not; every member of the 
concept was on equal footing. 
However, cognitive researchers discovered that these claims did not 
hold up to empirical research. For example, researchers discovered that 
concepts are actually quite “fuzzy” or inexact.26 Individuals are often 
uncertain about whether an entity lay within a concept’s scope or not (e.g., 
Are carpets furniture? Are penguins birds?). The classical approach 
refused to allow for this kind of indeterminacy in category membership.
27
 
Empirical studies also showed that concepts exhibit typicality effects; that 
is, some elements of a concept-category are viewed as more “typical” than 
others. An apple is a more typical fruit than a fig, even though both are 
deemed to be fruits by most individuals. The definitional approach cannot 
account for these features.  
In short, cognitive scientists demonstrated quite decisively that 
individuals do not utilize concepts by invoking necessary and sufficient 
criteria. Some other mechanism, they argued, must explain how 
individuals use concepts in ordinary conversations. In recent years, 
cognitive scientists have offered various theories to better explain 
conceptual practices, with names such as the prototype, exemplar, and the 
theory-theory models.
28
 The details of these models need not concern us 
here; rather, the important point is that cognitive science has persuasively 
demonstrated that ordinary concepts are not based on a simple definitional 
model.   
 
 
 23. LAKOFF, supra note 21, at 6.  
 24. See MURPHY, BIG BOOK, supra note 19, at 15. 
 25. Id. at 15.  
 26. Id. at 19.  
 27. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis, Introduction to CONCEPTS: CORE READINGS 23 (Stephen 
Laurence & Eric Margolis eds., 2000) [hereinafter CORE READINGS]. 
 28. For an overview of some leading models, see Dennis Earle, Concepts, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/ (last visited May 12, 2014).  
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2014] ON THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 87 
 
 
 
 
C. Descriptive Conceptual Analysis in Legal Theory 
The discussion thus far has focused on key changes in the practice of 
conceptual analysis. We have seen how the realist view of concepts has 
been replaced by a naturalistic one, and how this change has led to a 
concomitant modification in the method of analysis. This is, to be sure, a 
somewhat simplified version of recent history. It leaves out certain key 
developments in mainstream philosophy, including efforts by some 
theorists to revitalize conceptual analysis as a philosophical practice.
29
 
Nonetheless, the storyline allows us to see how assumptions about the 
nature of concepts relate to the ways in which descriptive analysis is 
carried out. It also offers a basic overview of key methodological 
questions, which serves as useful background as we turn to explore the 
way descriptive conceptual analysis is used in legal philosophy. 
Like their fellow practitioners in science and philosophy, descriptive 
legal theorists must, at least implicitly, take a position on the nature of 
concepts. Though theorists rarely confront the issue directly, several speak 
as if they are committed to the traditional view that the concept of law is a 
real thing, with a kind of transcendental existence. Of course, legal 
theorists never say so explicitly, but the commitment to a kind of 
Platonism is implicit in certain claims advanced. Specifically, a 
surprisingly large number of legal philosophers contend that the goal of 
legal theory is to identify the necessary or essential features of the concept 
of law.
30
  
Colloquially at least, the language of necessity implies that the concept 
of law possesses an invariable and inherent form or structure. Thus, saying 
that the law is necessarily normative suggests that normativity is a fixed, 
 
 
 29. Perhaps the leading advocate today is Frank Jackson, whose recent writings have sparked 
renewed debate about the role of conceptual analysis in philosophy. See FRANK JACKSON, FROM 
METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS (1998). For criticism of Jackson, see Alexander Miller, Jackson, Serious 
Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis, 71 ANALYSIS REVS. 574 (2011). A full evaluation of Jackson’s 
work is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 30. See, e.g., DICKSON, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that a “successful theory of law” is one “that 
consists of propositions of law which are necessarily true,” and that a theory of law must “at least 
consist[] of necessarily true propositions.”); Danny Priel, Jurisprudence and Necessity, 20 CAL. J.L. & 
JURIS. 173, 200 (2007) (noting that, during the 20th century, “legal philosophers tried to find those 
features that are necessarily true of any possible legal system, including that of a society of angels.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law, in NEUTRALITY AND THE THEORY 
OF LAW (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, ed. 2013) (“I assume not only that there are concepts, and not only that 
they can be analyzed in terms of their necessary or essential properties, but also that there is a concept 
of law and that the concept of law is one of the concepts that can be so analyzed.”).  
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inherent, unchanging part of the law.
31
 Brian Leiter has rightly criticized 
these claims: 
[L]egal philosophy is, indeed, descriptive, and trivially so, in 
exactly the way most other branches of practical philosophy have an 
important descriptive component. The real worry about 
jurisprudence isn't that it is descriptive . . . but rather that it relies on 
two central argumentative devices-analyses of concepts and appeals 
to intuition-that are epistemologically bankrupt.
32
 
Legal theorists, Leiter continues, seem to be acting as if Quine’s challenge 
to necessary conditions had not been made, and that a pre-modern view of 
concepts remains persuasive.
33
 It is, of course, conceivable that theorists, 
when speaking of the search for the “necessary” or “essential” features of 
law, are using those terms in special or idiosyncratic ways.
34
 But if that is 
so, it behooves them to articulate clearly what that special meaning is. 
Let us assume, charitably, that legal theorists do not really mean to 
adopt a realist view of concepts when they speak of seeking the 
“necessary” and “essential” features of the law. If that is so, legal theorists 
must instead adopt the naturalist’s perspective—the view that concepts 
reflect mental processes. The implication is that legal theorists and 
cognitive scientists share the same general goal—to model how human 
beings use and understand concepts. For legal theorists, the focus is on a 
specific concept—the concept of law.35  
 
 
 31. See Dennis Patterson, Notes on the Methodology Debate in Contemporary Jurisprudence: 
Why Sociologists Might Be Interested, 8 LAW & SOC. 254, 256 (2006) (“Since Plato, philosophers have 
endeavored to develop accounts of concepts that unpack their content in terms of necessities. 
According to the so-called ‘Classical Theory of Concepts,’ most concepts are ‘structured mental 
representations that encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their application. . . .’”) 
(quoting CORE READINGS, supra note 27, at 8, 10).  
 32. Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 
48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 43–44 (2003). 
 33. Id. at 46–47 (claims about necessary and essential truths “depend on the assumption that 
Quine is fundamentally wrong about analyticity, an assumption that, at this late date, requires some 
explicit defense if we are to take the results of jurisprudential inquiry seriously.”).  
 34. Joseph Raz is one prominent theorist who asserts that his goal is to articulate the necessary 
features of “law.” He also, however, seems to adopt a highly idiosyncratic—and not particularly 
clear—definition of “necessity.” See Brian Bix, Raz on Necessity, 22 LAW & PHIL. 537, 555 (2003) 
(“Raz’s idea of ‘necessity’ is distinctly different from what one finds elsewhere in philosophy: sharply 
different from logical necessity, and almost as distant from the type of necessity discussed in the 
context of Platonic philosophy and ‘natural kinds’ theories.”). Without further clarity, one cannot tell 
precisely what form of conceptual analysis Raz is employing. See id. at 556 (Raz’s “view of necessity 
requires further elaboration, and it carries no automatic immunity to the recent general criticisms of 
conceptual analysis in jurisprudence, nor does it offer any easy answers to those challenges.”). 
 35. To be sure, legal theorists typically lack the institutional competence to employ the same 
rigorous empirical methods used by cognitive scientists. At best, legal theorists must rely on their own 
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The question remains: can this kind of empirical approach offer an 
appealing method of jurisprudence? It is easy to be skeptical. The 
empirical approach faces formidable obstacles when applied to the concept 
of law. Perhaps the most significant is the problem of polysemy.  
1. Polysemy and the Law 
Polysemy is the property of having multiple meanings.
36 
A moment’s 
reflection makes clear that the term “law,” itself, is polysemous. As Joseph 
Raz points out, the term can be used to refer to religious law, scientific 
law, natural law, and what we might call “juridical” law (or “law in the 
legal sense”).37 These different categories share certain features. Among 
other things, all refer to phenomena that are thought to possess certain 
“rule-like” behavior. But these are not identical concepts, and they 
encompass different sets of phenomena.  
Legal theorists are not typically interested in examining scientific or 
religious law. They are interested in analyzing juridical law. Nonetheless, 
even if we limit our attention to that concept, polysemy remains. Ronald 
Dworkin has identified several significant ways that the term “law” is used 
in the legal field.
38
 Law, for example, might refer to a “type of institutional 
social structure,” as in the sentence: “Law first appeared in England in the 
first century.”39 Or the term might be used to refer to the system of rules 
and regulations within a designated jurisdiction, as in the sentence: 
“United States law reflects the power of money and corporations in the 
political process.”40  
These are relatively abstract concepts of law. But other more focused 
conceptual understandings are possible as well. Ronald Dworkin identifies 
one such concept, which he calls the “doctrinal” concept of law.41 This 
term refers to the specific rulings existing within a given jurisdiction at a 
given time. An example is the claim that “under Rhode Island law a 
 
 
knowledge and familiarity with the legal regime to develop hypotheses of how human beings 
understand the concept of law. If these tools are more rudimentary, the overriding goal is similar; it is 
to model how individuals use and understand the category labeled law. 
 36. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
 37. See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 196 (1994). 
 38. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 2–5, 140–86 (discussing various concepts of law). 
 39. Id. at 3. Dworkin calls this the “sociological” concept of law. Id.  
 40. Id. See also Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Law is Not (Best Considered) an Essentially Contested 
Concept, 7 INT’L J. OF LAW IN CONTEXT 209 (2011). 
 41. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 5 (“Our main question is about the nature of the doctrinal concept 
of law.”). 
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contract signed by someone under the age of twelve is invalid.”42 Dworkin 
suggests that most legal theorists are particularly interested in analyzing 
the scope and content of doctrinal law.
43
  
In fact, Dworkin’s preliminary list of concepts understates the 
complexity of the conceptual landscape. Upon reflection, one can see that 
doctrinal law itself encompasses several different categories, with subtly 
different contours. For example, we might speak of doctrinal law as 
referring to past rules promulgated by authoritative institutions. This 
concept, which might be called “precedential law,” can be illustrated by a 
statement such as: “the holding of Bush v. Gore is the law.” By contrast, a 
different concept, which might be called “prescriptive law,” refers to legal 
decisions justified according to favored standards of interpretation. This 
concept is employed in the sentence: “Bush v. Gore was certainly contrary 
to the law.”  
As these two examples highlight, the many meanings of “law” allow us 
to say seemingly paradoxical things, such as: “Bush v. Gore may be the 
law, but it was also contrary to law.” That statement makes sense only 
because the sentence uses the term “law” in two different ways. The first 
use refers to the precedential concept, the second to the prescriptive one. 
Both are variants on doctrinal law. No doubt, additional variations of 
doctrinal law can be identified upon further reflection.
44
 But the overriding 
point by now should be clear: the term “law” can refer to a multitude of 
concepts, even when limited to its juridical sense.  
2. Hart’s Descriptive Conceptualism 
Polysemy poses a serious problem for legal theorists engaged in 
descriptive conceptual analysis. To illustrate the depth of these difficulties, 
this section considers several influential claims advanced by H.L.A. Hart, 
who is widely viewed as the most influential legal philosopher of the last 
half-century. Hart, like many of his fellow conceptualists, claimed to be 
describing “the” concept of law. But we can see that this ambition is 
deeply problematic. It makes no sense to speak of “the” concept of law 
 
 
 42. Id. at 2. See id. at 263 n.1 (“The doctrinal concept collects valid normative claims or 
propositions . . . .”).  
 43. Id. at 30 (noting that Hart and many of his followers seemed most concerned with analyzing 
doctrinal concepts of law, while also “wondering whether some of Hart’s followers should now be 
understood as defending” other concepts of law as well). 
 44. See supra Part I.B regarding “predictive” concept of law. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] ON THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 91 
 
 
 
 
when we have a myriad of different concepts. None of these concepts are 
privileged over the others.
45
 
Hart’s other claims about the concept of law are similarly suspect. A 
central goal of his analysis, for example, is to demonstrate that law is 
fundamentally “normative.” By this, Hart means that individuals view law 
as imposing obligations of obedience. Thus, says Hart, it is perfectly 
intelligible to say that one should stop at a red light because “it is the law,” 
even if failure to stop poses no risk of punishment.
46
  
Hart’s argument here again overlooks the problem of polysemy. It is 
certainly true that individuals speak of the “law” as imposing an obligation 
of obedience. But individuals also commonly invoke the term “law” to 
refer to a risk of punishment. An individual, for example, might ask his tax 
attorney whether a certain deduction is “against the law.” The individual is 
interested in only one thing: whether the action will make him subject to 
sanction. He is using “law” in a “predictive” sense, which lacks any 
normative aspect.  
The point is that individuals sometimes use the term “law” to refer to 
the normative conception of the law, sometimes to a predictive 
conception, and sometimes to other concepts of law. None of these 
concepts is more correct than the others. The most charitable interpretation 
of Hart’s descriptive approach is that he recognizes the multitude of 
possible concepts associated with the term “law,” but simply chooses to 
examine one normative concept in detail.  
If that is the case, which concept is Hart’s target? Hart seems most 
interested in analyzing the scope of existing legal rules, so it seems 
plausible to view his analysis as targeting a version of doctrinal law. One 
option is the concept of “prescriptive” law which, recall, encompasses 
court rulings that are justified according to favored principles of 
interpretation. The problem is that if we adopt this more limited focus, 
Hart’s remaining claims seem patently false.  
Perhaps Hart’s most prominent claim is that the concept of law is 
grounded upon a “rule of recognition” which sets forth a set of criteria for 
determining what counts as valid law. The rule of recognition is 
supposedly structured in a hierarchal way to ensure that it is possible to 
offer a determinate answer to the question, “What is the law?” Moreover, 
 
 
 45. To claim that a specific concept is right or best would require a theorist to rely on some 
standard of normative value, which is out of bounds in any descriptive analysis. Dan Priel, Description 
and Evaluation in Jurisprudence, 29 LAW & PHIL. 633, 633–51 (2010).  
 46. See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 82. Hart sharply attacks John Austin’s interpretation of the 
concept of law for failing to account for law’s normativity. Id. at 82–91. 
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Hart says, the rule of recognition is shared by public officials.
47
 Agreement 
on the rule of recognition means that public officials in a given jurisdiction 
share a common concept of doctrinal law. This idea of a shared concept 
grounded on criteria of legal validity might be referred to as Hart’s 
“conventionality thesis.” 
As a claim about how public officials actually think, however, the 
conventionality thesis is wildly implausible.
48
 Certainly, if we examine 
how public officials actually reach decisions about cases, we will find 
some agreement on certain, very general, criteria of validity. In 
constitutional decision-making, for example, most judges would likely 
agree that precedent, text, and original intent are relevant to some degree 
in deciding on the appropriate result in a given case. But public officials 
disagree on certain criteria too—like the relevance of public morality—
and they plainly disagree on the weight given to each factor.  
What we do not find is agreement on a structured, hierarchal set of 
criteria that determines what is valid law in each case. The plain fact that 
public officials disagree on what the law is, demonstrates the falsity of that 
view. In the end, empirical analysis of prescriptive law tells us nothing 
except what we already know—that officials share certain basic criteria, 
disagree on others, and disagree on how those criteria apply to specific 
cases.  
Perhaps, though, we are mistaken about Hart’s focus. Perhaps Hart is 
interested in analyzing a different kind of doctrinal law—“precedential” 
law. That concept, recall, refers to the rules previously promulgated by 
authoritative institutions, rules that individuals believe count as valid 
precedent. Would this alternative perspective change our conclusions 
about the descriptive methodology’s appeal?  
Unfortunately, it would not. Once again, the analysis reveals little of 
interest. Such an analysis would no doubt demonstrate that public officials 
share certain basic criteria (e.g., rulings by the Supreme Court that have 
not been reversed count as precedent). It would also show that they 
disagree (or at least fail to agree) on certain points of controversy (e.g., Do 
very old decisions still count as precedent? Do decisions whose rationale 
have been discredited, but have yet to be overruled, still count as 
 
 
 47. HART, supra note 1, at 115 (“Here what is crucial is that there should be a unified or shared 
official acceptance of the rule of recognition containing the system’s criteria of validity.”). 
 48. Kenneth Einar Himma, Ambiguously Stung: Dworkin′s Semantic Sting Reconfigured, 8 
LEGAL THEORY 145, 159 (2002) (finding the empirical claim that individual’s share criteria “is so 
obviously implausible that it cannot charitably be attributed to any reasonably sophisticated theory of 
law.”). 
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precedent?). But as empirical findings, these results are banal. They tell us 
what we already know about the rules of precedent—that we agree on 
many rules defined at a general level but disagree on others in particular 
cases.  
Hart’s claims about a shared rule of recognition face serious problems. 
Attempts to analyze the concepts of precedential or prescriptive law 
demonstrate that public officials do not share a structured, hierarchal set of 
validity criteria. To the extent that we share criteria of validity at all, the 
criteria must be characterized at high levels of abstraction, which drains 
the conclusions of interest. If Hart’s theory is the most influential example 
of the empirical approach in legal theory, the prospects for that method are 
not promising.  
D. Reconsidering Descriptive Analysis of the Law 
Our analysis has raised serious questions about the appeal of 
descriptive conceptual analysis in jurisprudence. Traditional forms of 
“intuitive analysis” rest on unacceptable assumptions about the existence 
of a transcendent concept of law. Meanwhile, the empirical approach faces 
daunting obstacles, including the fact that law is intractably polysemous. 
Many concepts of law exist, and little of significance can be said about 
any of these on descriptive grounds.  
To be sure, empirical forms of conceptual analysis can generate 
interesting insights about the human mind. Cognitive scientists continue to 
make important findings about the way human beings form and 
understand categories of thought. But that kind of empirical study falls 
outside the institutional competence of legal theorists, and it does not 
necessarily yield insights of unique interest to the legal academy. If 
conceptual analysis is to have a central role to play in legal philosophy, it 
will have to be through its “normative”—rather than descriptive—forms.  
II. NORMATIVE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
Normative forms of conceptual analysis do not attempt to model 
existing conceptual practices; they attempt to say how concepts “should” 
be structured. To make these claims, normative theorists must rely on 
some standard of justification; the methods vary based on the standard of 
justification employed. Some normative theorists rely on moral arguments 
for their prescriptions, others on instrumental goals. These two major 
categories of normative conceptual analysis are examined, each in turn, 
below. 
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A. Categorical Conceptual Analysis 
Moral principles generate categorical obligations for choosing a certain 
course or conduct.
49
 Thus, in the context of conceptual analysis, moral 
arguments can generate categorical obligations for adopting a specific 
concept of law. One might find it strange to think that morality has 
anything to do with how we interpret or understand the concept of law. 
Nonetheless, a number of theorists have made precisely that argument. 
These theorists argue, on moral grounds, that a single concept of law 
should be adopted as the concept of law.
50
  
1. Concepts and Consequences 
The moral arguments are, invariably, consequentialist in nature; the 
idea is that the adoption of a specific concept of law will have good 
consequences for society.
51
 As Frederick Schauer put it, “the moral 
question is not one about the morality of a definition per se, but rather 
about the moral consequences of a society having this rather than that 
understanding of some social phenomenon . . . .”52  
 
 
 49. See Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and 
Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 MISS. L.J. 559, 585 (2004) (“Moral principles, then, are any 
ultimate, non-instrumental principle that generate categorical obligations.”). 
 50. Examples of moralists include Neil MacCormick, Tom Campbell, Gerald Postema, Frederick 
Schauer, and until recently Liam Murphy. See Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic 
Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Campbell, supra note 10; GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE 
COMMON LAW TRADITION 332 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY 
OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 31, 32 (Robert P. George ed., 1999) [hereinafter Positivism as 
Pariah]. Liam Murphy’s views on this matter are evolving. In an article written in 2001, he suggested 
that normative considerations alone determine which conceptual approach should predominate. But in 
a more recent article, Murphy repudiated that position. See Liam Murphy, Better To See Law This 
Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088 (2008). 
 51. Liam Murphy, The Political Question of the Concept of Law, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 384 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
Political Question] (“The dispute about the concept of law is a political argument for control over a 
concept that has great ideological significance . . . . The dispute comprises the practical question of the 
social consequences of accepting one rather than another regimentation as well as the political 
question of which consequences we should be aiming at.”); Philip Soper, Choosing a Legal Theory on 
Moral Grounds, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 31, 31 (1986) (“According to this theory, the reason we must 
see law and morality as separate is not . . . because of the logic of our language, but because of the 
practical implications” of a conceptual approach.). 
 52. Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, supra note 50, at 34. Oddly, Julie Dickson critiques Schauer’s 
attempts to offer this kind of normative approach, saying it represents “wishful thinking” about what 
the concept might be, not a description of what law really is. See DICKSON, supra note 6, at 88. 
Dickson mistakenly assumes that the only approach to conceptual analysis is descriptive, and she fails 
to realize that Schauer is offering a normative claim about how the law should be understood, not a 
descriptive claim about how the concept of law is. See Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of 
the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (2005). See also 
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This argument is premised on the assumption that conceptual schemes 
influence human perception and, ultimately, behavior. How is that 
possible? In effect, the moralists argue that the way in which we 
conceptualize “law” affects the way we view government authority. On 
this line of thinking, individuals tend to view government rules as falling 
within a concept of “obligatory law”—a concept that assumes these rules 
impose obligations of obedience on individual citizens. More specifically, 
the existence of a government rule is treated as a criterion of identification 
for the application of the label “law,” and that in turn is associated with the 
concept of obligatory law.
53
 The result is that individuals tend to move 
quickly from the view that something is a government rule to the idea that 
it automatically (or presumptively) generates obligations of obedience (see 
Figure 2).
54
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
  
 This is not problematic, of course, if government rules really deserve 
obedience. But moralists dispute such a view, which is why they worry 
that individuals apply the concept of obligatory law indiscriminately and 
erroneously to all government rules.  
 
 
Campbell, supra note 10, at 27–28. (“The prescriptive conceptualist might be accused of fallacious 
argumentation in drawing conceptual conclusions from prescriptive premises. . . . This would certainly 
be the case, if the positivist is claiming that her conclusions are about how a concept is actually used in 
practice, but it is not invalid if what is going on is a recommendation about how a term ought to be 
used.”). 
 53. The use of criteria of identification is common when employing concepts. For example in 
determining whether something is an orange, human beings rely on various criteria, including the color 
and shape of the object. If we see a round, orange-colored, appropriately textured object, we might 
assume it is an orange. Texture, shape, color all serve to identify the concept-category. Of course, the 
use of criteria of identification can lead to mistakes. If we bite into the round, orange thing and taste 
bitterness, we might reconsider whether the thing really falls within the concept of an “orange.” 
(Perhaps it is a persimmon).  
 54. Hans Kelsen, Law, State and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, YALE L.J. 377, 383–84 
(1948) (“[T]he real effect of the terminological identification of law and justice is an illicit justification 
of any positive law.”). 
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According to the moralists, this error has serious negative 
consequences. It leads to a kind of “quietism,” an unthinking obedience to 
government actions, and that in turn undermines social welfare. The 
moralists’ chief case in point is the rise of the Nazi party in Germany prior 
to World War II. According to some theorists, German citizens during that 
period applied the concept of obligatory law to all of the government rules 
of the Nazi regime. That contributed to an unthinking obedience to the 
directives of a deeply immoral regime.
55
 
The central question for the moralists is how to respond to the overly 
quick move from government rule to obligation. In practice, moralists tend 
to disagree on the best solution. Natural lawyers tend to target the 
inferential jump from government rule to “law.” They argue that the best 
way to avoid error is to encourage individuals to pause and consider the 
morality of the government rule before attaching the label “law.” In effect, 
citizens are asked to apply a “moral test” to government edicts. Using this 
test, German citizens would refuse to call Nazi rules “law” because those 
rules fail the moral test.  
Traditional positivists—at least those in the tradition of John Austin—
take a different tact.
56
 Rather than targeting the move from government 
rule to “law,” they seek to alter the concept associated with the word 
“law.” The term should refer not to a concept of obligation, but simply to 
the existence of the government rule itself.
57 
By marking a clear separation 
between law and obligation, positivists attempt to counter the presumption 
that government rules are always binding.
58
 From this perspective, Nazi 
rules would still be called “law,” but they would not be treated as 
generating duties of obedience.  
 
 
 55. Perhaps the most famous argument along these lines was presented by Richard Radbruch 
who, according to Hart, argued that the Germans’ willingness to equate “law” with “obligation” 
contributed to the horrors of World War II. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617 (1957). 
 56. Austin rejected the idea that the concept of law implies the existence of a moral obligation. 
For him, law was rooted in the idea of punishment and sanction. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 50, at 
1093 (describing differences among positivists old and new).  
 57. Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, supra note 50, at 37 (“If no moral evaluation is incorporated 
into the identification of legality, then the identification of legality would have no moral import, and 
the fact of legality would be a morally neutral social fact. And it therefore comes as no surprise to 
discover that theorists holding these traditional conceptions of positivism have been among the leading 
proponents of the view that there is no moral obligation to obey the law.”). See also Murphy, supra 
note 50, at 1099 (“A person with a nonpositivist understanding of law may adopt an uncritical attitude 
toward the legal materials the state produces. He may think: This is presented as law, so it probably is 
law and, therefore, given the nature of law, is probably not too bad.”). 
 58. HART, supra note 1, at 50–60.  
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In the past, natural lawyers and positivists argued vehemently over 
which approach was best. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that 
both have the same ultimate goal: to disrupt the unreflective assumption 
that government rules always generate obligations of obedience. The two 
sides differ merely in the means to that end. Natural lawyers say that Nazi 
rules are “not law”—and hence not binding—because they are immoral. 
Positivists argue that Nazi rules are “law”—but do not bind—because law 
is not obligatory.  
2.  Critiquing the Consequentialist Argument 
Though the moralists’ argument may have some initial appeal, it 
ultimately suffers from several core deficiencies. One might begin by 
quibbling with the core premise that greater skepticism of government 
rules will promote social welfare. That certainly seems debatable; 
increased skepticism of government power might reduce welfare if it 
undermines social cohesion and respect for law to an excessive degree.
59
 
Even if one accepts the idea that skepticism is a good thing, the moralists’ 
argument faces a profound problem. It rests on highly implausible 
assumptions about conceptual practices. 
As an initial matter, it assumes that conceptual understandings are 
easily manipulated and modified. But the reality is that conceptual 
understandings about social arrangements are often deeply entrenched. 
Beliefs about the obligatory force of government rules, for example, are 
likely the product of powerful social and cultural forces. Social 
institutions, especially those with economic and political power, desire 
stability and obedience. Through subtle and explicit means, government 
institutions tend to foster beliefs in the binding nature of their directives. 
As Philip Soper points out, “most regimes will claim that their official 
directives are just.”60 One would, therefore, expect citizens to be subject to 
enormous social pressure to believe that they have a duty to obey the law. 
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Murphy, Political Question, supra note 51, at 390 (“Why should we believe it—
why not, indeed, believe the contrary claim that the denial of the social thesis leads not to quietism but 
rather to excessive disrespect for the legal regime?”). Great skepticism might also have other 
unintended effects, like encouraging institutional actors to change their conduct in problematic ways. 
For example, it might lead judges to give less deference to precedent, undermining rule of law 
principles. These kinds of effects would have to be incorporated into the consequentialist framework, 
and they might not all be positive. See id. at 394 (noting different factors to consider). See also 
Murphy, supra note 50, at 1095–1100. This criticism might not be decisive, but it makes clear that the 
moralists’ claims rest on assumptions that are not self-evidently true and might be relative to a specific 
time and place. 
 60. Soper, supra note 51, at 45. 
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That informal pressure will be, on occasion, backed by formal sanctions, a 
concrete demonstration of a government’s power and force.  
If this is an accurate depiction, it is not surprising that a term like “law” 
is applied to government rules that are associated with obligations of 
obedience; individuals are socialized to defer to state power. Without 
changing these underlying beliefs, it is not clear how legal theorists can 
hope to change the meaning or application of the term “law.” Theorists, 
for their part, offer no mechanism for achieving that result, which makes 
their arguments seem like fantasies from the Ivory Tower.
61
 
Moreover, even if the word could be changed, it would not produce the 
results that moralists desire. Suppose, for example, that citizens were 
compelled to adopt the positivist view that “law” referred simply to the 
existence of a government rule, without any connotation of bindingness or 
obligation. Citizens would continue to believe that the government 
deserves obedience.
62
 They would just have to find different ways of 
expressing that sentiment. That, of course, would not be difficult to do. 
Citizens could still refer to government rules as obligatory, either by using 
a different term (say, by referring to government rules as “precepts”), or 
by adding adjectives to the word “law” (say, by referring to government 
rules as “binding law”).63 In other words, without changing underlying 
beliefs, a conceptual change makes little difference.
64
 A similar result 
 
 
 61. For a similar point, see Murphy, supra note 50, at 1100–01 (“The instrumental argument has 
no purpose if there is no serious prospect of convergence on the preferred usage. Where the motivation 
for an explication is that convergence on the new meaning will have good effects, it would be pointless 
to offer an explication outside a constrained and perhaps professionalized context of communication. 
. . . The thought that the urging of theorists might change the usage of “law” . . . seems absurd.”). 
 62. Soper, supra note 51, at 48 (A “[m]oral conscience, if it is inclined to yield to officialdom, 
will do so regardless of the prevailing legal theory because both positivist and natural law regimes will 
claim that their directives are just.”).  
 63. In these cases, the status quo would be retained, with the word “precept” or “binding law” 
replacing the word “law.” Cf. Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, supra note 50, at 41–42 (assessing the 
appeal of replacing the word “law” with an alternative term, such as “social directive”).  
 64. I say “little” difference, because one cannot discount entirely the possibility that the way 
concepts are used might influence an individual’s belief system to some limited degree. Cognitive 
scientists have found that in some situations, changes to conceptual practice can have a small, but 
nonnegligible, effect on human perception. Thus, for example, research by Lena Boroditsky has found 
that differences in the way Russian and English speakers conceptualize color affects those speakers’ 
color perception. For example, English speakers have a single word for the color blue. Russians do 
not; instead, they have words light blue (goluboy) and dark blue (siniy). Boroditsky’s research found 
that these differences affected Russian speakers’ color perception by ensuring that the Russians had 
greater awareness of subtle shades of the color blue. Lera Boroditsky, How Does Our Language Shape 
the Way We Think?, in WHAT’S NEXT: DISPATCHES ON THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE 116 (Max Brockman 
ed., 2009). Whether these findings can be extended to complex, abstract concepts such as law is 
doubtful, but even if some minimal effect existed, it would likely be dwarfed by the deeper cultural 
values about government power that permeate society.   
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would occur if citizens were compelled to adopt the natural law 
interpretation.
65
  
The overarching point is that changing the way “law” is defined is not 
easily achieved, and even if it were, it would not change the way citizens 
think about government power. Where beliefs on government authority are 
strongly held, a change in conceptualization—even if possible—would 
have little effect. Concepts do not drive beliefs, beliefs drive conceptual 
practices. 
3. The Cynicism of Normative Theorists 
Laid plain, the moralists’ arguments seem like fanciful academic 
speculations. But these musings also have a cynical quality that deserves 
comment. The moralists are concerned about a perceived danger, a worry 
that citizens are passive and unthinking in the face of government power. 
However, they seek to counter quietism in a way that itself treats citizens 
as unthinking pawns. Rather than trying to educate citizens about the need 
for greater vigilance against government overreaching, the moralists 
attempt to alter human conduct by manipulating the concepts associated 
with the word “law.” This prescription calls to mind infamous attempts by 
real and fictional regimes to control the public by manipulating language.
66
 
There is a way to respond to concerns about quietism while also 
respecting an individual’s capacity to make reasoned decisions about what 
to believe. That approach requires an effort, not to manipulate concepts, 
but to address the deeper substantive questions that citizens have about 
 
 
 65. If citizens are already predisposed to believing that government rules are morally justified, 
adopting a natural law interpretation will not alter their view that government rules are obligatory. 
They will continue to apply the term “law” to government directives, since they will assume that those 
rules are morally justified.  
 66. The Third Reich’s attempts to manipulate language are one historical example. See, e.g, 
VICTOR KLEMPERER, LANGUAGE OF THE THIRD REICH: LINGUA TERTII IMPERII (3d ed. 2006). The 
most famous fictional attempt, of course, is Big Brother’s efforts to impose “Newspeak” on its 
citizens, as described in the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. One loyal subject explains the strategy this 
way:  
Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end 
we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to 
express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with 
its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten. . . . The 
Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect. Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is 
Newspeak . . . . Has it ever occurred to you, Winston, that by the year 2050, at the very latest, 
not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are 
having now? 
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-ROUR 55 (Everyman’s Library 1992) (1949). 
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whether or when government rules deserve to be obeyed. This approach 
inevitably raises deep philosophical questions that have so far remained 
suppressed. Is there really an obligation to obey the law? If so, how much 
weight should be given to that obligation?  
These are not simply conceptual questions. They involve substantive 
arguments about the relationship between government power and social 
obligation. Theorists who believe that greater skepticism of government is 
warranted would need to develop arguments to persuade citizens to adopt 
their preferred position. That project would, of course, have no guarantee 
of success. Even if a cogent philosophical argument could be developed, 
few citizens will have the patience for the kind of philosophical reflection 
the approach would require. Nonetheless, this is the only approach that 
treats citizens as thinking beings, showing respect for their ability to 
grapple with the thorny issues of law’s normativity. 
B. Contingent Conceptual Analysis 
Moral principles are not the only basis for making a statement about 
how concepts “should” be interpreted. One can also offer “hypothetical” 
or “contingent” reasons for a specific concept. These are arguments that 
justify a given action based on the promotion of an accepted objective, 
even if that objective is not a moral one. Such an example would be the 
statement, “you should press down the accelerator if you want to go 
faster.” This is a normative statement (a “should” statement), but it does 
not rely on moral arguments.  
An analogous statement might be made about the concept of law. The 
argument would take the form: “Theorists should define the concept of 
law to be X, in order to promote goal Y.” On the assumption that 
participants agree on goal Y, this normative argument would identify 
reasons for action. This method generates “hypothetical” or “contingent” 
obligations (rather than categorical ones), since any obligation is 
dependent on the acceptance of the relevant goal.
67
 We will thus call this 
approach the “contingent” form of conceptual analysis.  
 
 
 67.  See DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 218 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1942) (“Hypothetical 
obligation is expressed in such sentences as ‘If you want so and so . . . then you must or should do 
such and such.’ Here the necessity or obligatoriness is conditional, depending on whether or not one 
desires the end to which the action enjoined is conducive. Categorical obligation is expressed by 
simple sentences of the form, ‘You ought to do such and such’. Here the necessity of doing such and 
such is unconditional.”). See also Robert Johnson, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2014 ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-
moral/ (“There are ‘oughts’ other than our moral duties, but these oughts are distinguished from the 
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Several notable legal theorists have adopted contingent conceptual 
analysis. They have argued for a specific concept of law based on the 
claim that the interpretation advances certain theoretical goals.
68
 As Liam 
Murphy put it, this methodology means “we should let our theoretical 
practice develop the concept that suits it best: the 'best' concept of law will 
be the one that emerges in the process of developing the best social 
science of law.”69  
1. Leiter’s Contingent Conceptualism 
Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this view today is Brian 
Leiter.
70
 Leiter has argued that we should adopt a concept of law that 
“figures in the most fruitful a posteriori research programmes . . . that give 
us the best going account of how the world works.”71 What kind of 
program is that? It is one that involves the “descriptive study of the causal 
relations between input (facts and rules of law) and outputs (judicial 
decisions).”72 The goal is to “predict what courts will do.”73 In that 
endeavor, researchers attempt to identify factors that influence judicial 
action, which requires the use of methods drawn from the social 
sciences.
74 The reliance on these empirical methods is part of Leiter’s 
“naturalist” view of legal theory, which approaches legal theory from a 
scientific, deterministic viewpoint.
75
  
 
 
moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical 
imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a command that . . . requires us to exercise our wills in a 
certain way given we have antecedently willed an end.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 
TEX. L. REV. 267, n.161 (1997) [hereinafter Rethinking Legal Realism] (“As with any concept that has 
enjoyed wide and varied usage, the ultimate criterion for a definition of the concept must be its 
contribution to fruitful theory-construction”). See also HART, supra note 1, at 213–14 (“In the end we 
[rejected certain positions in the Nazi informer case not] because it conflicted with the weight of 
usage. Instead we criticized the attempt . . . on the ground that to do this did not advance or clarify 
either theoretical inquiries or moral deliberation.”). Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) 
Positivism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 410, 426–
27 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“[E]very community of scholars has a sense that the concepts and 
categories they use are theoretically useful; otherwise they would choose different concepts and 
categories.”).  
 69. Murphy, Political Question, supra note 50, at 383 (discussing H.L.A. Hart’s arguments along 
these lines).  
 70. H.L.A. Hart offers a different contingent argument in support of a positivist conception of 
law. His argument is that positivism helps clarify what issues are at stake in debates over whether to 
obey the law. I discuss this argument in a forthcoming article. 
 71. Leiter, Legal Realism/Hard Positivism, supra note 7, at 369. 
 72. Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 252.  
 73. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 68, at 286. 
 74. Leiter, Legal Realism/Hard Positivism, supra note 7, at 370. 
 75. See, e.g., id. (discussing attempt to “effect an explanatory unification of legal phenomena 
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Assuming for the moment that this really is the most fruitful research 
project, the next question is the critical one: what concept of law best 
promotes this endeavor? Leiter suggests that the answer can be found by 
looking at how empirical researchers themselves conceptualize the law. As 
he suggests, researchers should be expected to adopt the approach that best 
advances their research goals.
76
 Thus, “[i]f social science really cuts the 
causal joints of the legal world in Hart’s positivist terms, is that not a far 
more compelling reason to work with that concept of law as against its 
competitors?”77  
So how do social scientists apply the term “law”? According to Leiter, 
they use the term to refer to “hard factors”—factors relating to legal 
sources, such as the statutory text or the legislature’s intent. These are 
distinguished from “soft factors”—factors that concern individual 
characteristics or background conditions, such as a judge’s socioeconomic 
background or gender. Social scientists thus express a conceptual choice. 
They favor a form of “hard positivism,” which holds that doctrinal law is 
defined in terms of legal sources.
78 
As Leiter says, “hard positivism” is the 
theory of law that is presupposed by most naturalist studies of 
adjudication.
79
 As a result, hard positivism should be adopted as the 
concept of law.
80
   
 
 
with the other phenomena constituting the natural world which science has already mastered.”). 
According to Leiter, this approach is long overdue and would bring legal theory in line with the 
broader movement towards naturalism in mainstream philosophy. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, 
supra note 68, at 287 (“What really bears noticing here is that while every area of philosophy - 
metaethics, philosophy of language, epistemology, etc.—has undergone a naturalistic turn over the last 
quarter-century, Anglo-American legal philosophy has remained untouched by these intellectual 
developments.”); Brian Leiter, The Naturalistic Turn in Legal Philosophy, in NEWSL. ON PHIL. & LAW 
(The American Philosophical Association, Newark, DE), Spring: 142–46 (2001) (similar). 
 76. Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Fall 2014 ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism/ (“The crucial question 
becomes whether our best empirical science requires drawing the conceptual lines one way rather than 
another.”).  
 77. Id. 
 78. Leiter, Legal Realism/Hard Positivism, supra note 7, at 356–57 (distinguishing Hard and Soft 
Positivism). 
 79. See Leiter, supra note 76 (“Leading social scientific accounts of judicial decision-making . . . 
all aim to account for the relative causal contribution of law and non-law factors (e.g., political 
ideologies or ‘attitudes’) to judicial decisions; and second, they demarcate ‘law’ from non law factors 
in typical Hard Positivism terms; i.e., they generally treat as ‘law’ only pedigreed norms, like 
legislative enactments and prior holdings of courts.”); Leiter, Legal Realism/Hard Positivism, supra 
note 7, at 370 (these research programs “typically assume that law-based explanations of behaviour are 
confined to explanations in terms of pedigreed norms.”). 
 80. See Leiter, supra note 32, at 27 (“I am inclined to the view that Hard Positivism is correct 
. . . .”).  
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2. Critiquing Leiter 
Though superficially persuasive, Leiter’s argument ultimately fails on 
several fronts.
81
 As a preliminary matter, the argument rests almost 
entirely on the contention that social scientists associate the term “law” 
with hard positivism. Oddly, for one committed to empiricism, Leiter 
offers no factual support for that view.
82 
To be sure, it is plausible that 
some or even many theoreticians find it convenient to divide factors into 
hard and soft. However, that certainly does not mean every researcher 
“should” follow the same approach. (Imagine the conversation: “Mr. 
Statistician, you must categorize the predictive factors you identify into 
the following categories because others have done so...”). Each situation is 
unique, and given the right circumstances, some researchers might find it 
more useful to keep matters simple, and to disregard Leiter’s distinction 
between hard and soft factors.  
Most importantly, even if one agreed that hard positivism best 
promotes the social scientist’s predictive research project, it is not at all 
clear why that conceptual understanding should apply outside that 
scientist’s research domain. Why should legal theorists, for example, be 
governed by the categorizations used by social scientists? The only 
response that Leiter can make—and it is the crux of his argument—is that 
no other theoretical endeavor, apart from the social scientist’s, is worthy of 
consideration (at least none that have implications for interpreting the 
concept of law). That is why Leiter envisions legal theory as playing the 
handmaiden to the scientist’s research agenda, relegated to the task of 
identifying the concept of law used in scientific studies. 
Leiter’s contingent form of conceptual analysis, in sum, does not offer 
a path forward for legal theorists. His argument implicitly (if not 
explicitly) rests on skepticism about the independent value of legal 
philosophy, a perspective that drains legal theory—and conceptual 
analysis of the law—of much of its significance. Were he successful, his 
argument would intensify, rather than diminish, existing doubts about the 
goals and methods of jurisprudence.  
 
 
 81. For additional criticism, see Brian Bix, Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence, 1 LEGAL 
THEORY 465, 477–78 (1995). 
 82. One might be skeptical of the claim that social science researchers have adopted a uniform 
interpretation of the term “law.” For example, it certainly seems plausible that researchers use the term 
“law” to refer, not simply to the factors driving judicial decisions, but to the actual rules produced by 
the judicial decisions themselves. If that is the case, then researchers might actually employ more than 
one concept of law in their projects, and none can be said to be “correct.”  
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Leiter’s failure does not mean that other contingent arguments in 
support of a concept of law are impossible to imagine. It is just difficult to 
conceive of any contingent argument that can serve as the primary 
objective of analysis.
83
 Indeed, I am not aware of any example, since the 
publication of Hart’s The Concept of Law, where contingent arguments 
represent the primary focus of analysis. Given that state of affairs, the 
burden surely lies on the defenders of conceptual analysis to explain how 
contingent arguments might play a more significant role in legal theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Conceptual analysis has long been seen as a dominant method of 
jurisprudence. Though it is typically characterized as a single approach, 
the term actually encompasses a range of different methods. This paper 
has identified four types—intuitive, empirical, categorical, and contingent 
analysis—and has offered a preliminary evaluation of each. 
The assessment has generated a sharply negative conclusion: none of 
the forms of conceptual analysis are capable of serving as the primary 
method of jurisprudence. For the most part, these methods either generate 
unpersuasive or uninteresting claims, or else serve a secondary, ground-
clearing role in other, and more interesting, theoretical endeavors. The one 
area where conceptual analysis seems to offer promise is in the field of 
cognitive science. There, researchers have explored how individuals 
categorize—that is, conceptualize—common phenomena. Though fertile 
and insightful, this research agenda seems ill-suited for legal theorists, in 
part because it calls for technical and empirical skills that are beyond the 
expertise of most theorists. The bottom line is that legal philosophers 
should reject conceptual analysis as the central method of their endeavor. 
The question is what might replace it? A first step in formulating an 
answer is to realize that many of the most interesting questions in legal 
philosophy are not primarily conceptual; they are normative and 
substantive. These are questions such as: How should a court decide a 
 
 
 83. Contingent arguments, of course, can serve secondary, supporting functions. To give a 
simple example, suppose a theorist is seeking to assess the moral force of government rules. In doing 
so, she decides to use the label “law” to refer to government rules because she believes (rightly or 
wrongly) that this definition is consistent with ordinary understandings of the term (and so would be 
least likely to confuse an audience). This is a contingent argument for the positivist concept of law, 
since the validity of the conceptual choice depends on whether the theorist’s goal of avoiding 
confusion is found to be appealing under the circumstances. Even so, the conceptual question here is 
hardly at the center of the theoretical endeavor, which remains focused on assessing the moral status of 
the government rules. 
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specific case? Why should the defendant be punished? How should a 
political institution be structured? Those are questions that citizens, 
practitioners, and public officials alike struggle with and debate. Though 
conceptual clarity is certainly an important prerequisite in analyzing these 
questions, the ultimate issues transcend the conceptual and call on citizens 
to address perplexing disputes about how individuals and institutions 
should act.
84
 
Legal theory, if it is to be relevant and interesting, should play a role in 
helping citizens answer—or at least clarify—these normative issues. How 
can it do that? One tempting approach is for legal theorists to identify 
authoritative moral principles that can serve as the basis for determining 
how courts, citizens, and policymakers should proceed. In this regard, the 
task of legal theory would be to offer prescriptive arguments in favor of a 
specific course of action.  
Though this path might sound appealing, it also faces serious criticism 
as the primary method of doing jurisprudence. A core problem with this 
approach “is that the content of the authoritative principles is disputed. It 
is not obvious how one would go about proving which principles are 
authoritative, or even what kinds of principles provide 
authoritative answers.”85 But if legal theorists do not attempt to advance 
prescriptive claims of their own, how else might they help citizens engage 
the normative questions at the heart of legal disputes?  
The answer is to reject the prescriptive impulse and to focus instead on 
clarifying the underlying premises of the normative claims generated by 
the legal system. To put the point baldly, every legal ruling can be seen as 
a normative claim by the court, a claim that this is the way the decision 
should be made. Legal theorists might ask: What is the underlying basis 
for such a claim? What moral, political, and institutional assumptions must 
be accepted to justify that claim? What, in short, are the fundamental 
premises of belief?  
The effort to expose these underlying assumptions is sometimes called 
“rational reconstruction.” This method has modest ambitions. It does not 
aspire to determine the right or wrong ways of acting. Rather, it is “a tool 
for making more thoughtful judgments. It seeks to bring to light what has 
been suppressed, to make explicit what has been implicit, to encourage 
 
 
 84. This is true even for the question: “Should I obey the law?” Though that question requires a 
theorist to take a position, at least broadly, on the meaning of the term “law,” the truly challenging 
issue concerns whether that phenomena, however defined, generates obligations of obedience. I 
discuss this issue in more depth in a forthcoming article on H.L.A.’s method of legal theory.  
 85. See Rappaport, supra note 49, at 574–75. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
106 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:77 
 
 
 
 
self-awareness.”86 The methodology, in other words, helps clarify the 
underlying bases for belief. In doing so, it allows us to have a more 
reflective understanding of our political and legal decisions. 
Rational reconstruction offers a plausible method for doing legal 
theory, but it may not be the only candidate worthy of consideration. The 
point here is not to demonstrate that one methodology is the correct one. 
Rather, it is to challenge legal theorists to rethink their traditional 
commitment to conceptual analysis and to encourage further debate on the 
proper methodology of jurisprudence. If that debate occurs, legal theory 
can move beyond the sterile and unsatisfying questions that have 
distracted it in the past and hopefully emerge as a more vibrant and 
relevant theoretical pursuit. 
 
 
 86. See id. at 636. 
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